Who is RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo?

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”, has emerged as a dominant figure on Sudan’s political scene, with his paramilitary Rapid Support Forces now controlling half the country.

The Rapid Support Forces achieved a notable victory recently when they overran the city of El Fasher, the last garrison controlled by the Sudanese army and its local allies in the western Darfur region.

Feared and hated by his opponents, Hemedti is admired by his followers because of his determination, cruelty, and promise to destroy a state that has lost its credibility.

Hemedti has humble origins. His family belongs to the Mahariya section of the Arabic-speaking camel-herding Rizeigat tribe that stretches across Chad and Darfur.

He was born in 1974 or 1975, and his date and place of birth, like many rural residents, are not recorded.

His clan, led by his uncle Juma Dagolo, moved to Darfur in the 1970s and 1980s, fleeing the war and searching for greener pastures, and they were allowed to settle.

After leaving school in his early teens, Hemedti earned money trading camels across the Sahara to Libya and Egypt.

At the time, Darfur was Sudan’s Wild West, poor, lawless and neglected by the government of former President Omar al-Bashir.

Arab militiamen known as Janjaweed – including a force led by Juma Dagolo – have been attacking villages of the indigenous Fur ethnic group.

This cycle of violence led to a widespread rebellion in 2003, as the Masalit, Zaghawa and other groups joined the Fur fighters, saying they were ignored by the country’s Arab elite.

In response, Al-Bashir widely expanded the scope of the Janjaweed to lead his counterinsurgency efforts. They quickly gained notoriety for arson, looting, rape, and murder.

Hemedti’s unit was among them, and an African Union peacekeeping report said it attacked and destroyed the village of Adwa in November 2004, killing 126 people, including 36 children.

A US investigation concluded that the Janjaweed were responsible for the genocide.

The conflict in Darfur was referred to the International Criminal Court, which brought charges against four men, including Al-Bashir, who denied committing genocide.

Hemedti was one of several Janjaweed leaders who were considered too young to be under the prosecutor’s eye at the time.

Only one was brought to court, the Janjaweed “colonel”, Ali Abdul Rahman Kushayb.

Last month, he was convicted of 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and will be sentenced on November 19.

In the years following the height of the violence in 2004, Hemedti played his cards skillfully, rising to become the head of a powerful paramilitary force, a corporate empire, and a political machine.

It is a story of opportunism and entrepreneurship. He briefly rebelled, demanding back pay for his soldiers, promotions, and a political position for his brother. Bashir gave him most of what he wanted, and Hemedti returned to the fold.

Later, when other Janjaweed units rebelled, Hemedti led government forces that defeated them, in the process taking control of the largest artisanal gold mine in Darfur in a place called Jebel Amer.

The Hemedti family’s Aljunied company quickly became the largest gold exporter in Sudan.

In 2013, Hemedti requested—and received—official status as head of a new paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces, reporting directly to Bashir.

The Janjaweed were integrated into the RSF, receiving new uniforms, vehicles and weapons – as well as officers from the regular army who were brought in to help with the upgrade.

The Rapid Support Forces achieved an important victory against rebels in Darfur, performed less well in counterinsurgency in the Nuba Mountains bordering South Sudan, and were awarded a subcontract to monitor the border with Libya.

Ostensibly curbing illegal migration from Africa across the Sahara to the Mediterranean, Hemedti’s leaders also reportedly excelled at extortion and human trafficking.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates called on the Sudanese army to send forces to fight against the Houthis in Yemen.

The unit was led by the general who fought in Darfur, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and is now the commander of the army fighting a war with the Rapid Support Forces.

Hemedti saw an opportunity and negotiated a separate private deal with both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to provide RSF mercenaries.

The Abu Dhabi connection proved to be the most important. This was the beginning of a close relationship with Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed

Young Sudanese men – and increasingly from neighboring countries as well – have turned to RSF recruitment centers to receive cash payments of up to $6,000 (£4,500) upon registration.

Hemedti entered into a partnership with the Russian Wagner Group, where he received training in exchange for business dealings, including gold.

He visited Moscow to formalize the deal, and was there the day Russia invaded Ukraine. After the outbreak of war in Sudan, he denied that the Rapid Support Forces were receiving help from Wagner.

Although the RSF’s main combat units became more professional, they also included a coalition of old-style irregular ethnic militias.

While the regime was facing escalating popular protests, Al-Bashir ordered Hemedti’s units to head to the capital, Khartoum.

The president, as a tribute to his name, called him “Hemeti,” considering the RSF to be a counterweight to would-be coup perpetrators in the regular army and national security.

It was a miscalculation. In April 2019, a vibrant camp of civilian protesters surrounded the pro-democracy military headquarters.

Al-Bashir ordered the army to open fire on them. Senior generals, including Hemedti, met and decided to remove Bashir instead. The democratic movement celebrated.

For a while, Hemedti was feted as the new face of Sudan’s future. He was an elegant young man, actively socialized with various social groups, positioned himself as a rival to the country’s historical establishment, and tried to change his political colours. This only lasted a few weeks.

As he and the co-chair of the ruling military council, Burhan, faltered in handing over power to civilians, the demonstrators intensified their marches, and Hemedti unleashed the Rapid Support Forces, who killed hundreds of people, raped women, and They threw men into the Nile River with bricks tied to their ankles, according to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW)..

Hemedti denied that the RSF committed atrocities.

Under pressure from the Quartet of countries formed to promote peace and democracy in Sudan – the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – the generals and civilians agreed to a compromise drawn up by African mediators.

For two years, there has been an uneasy coexistence between a military-dominated sovereign council and a civilian government.

As the cabinet-appointed committee to investigate military-, security-, and RSF-owned companies approached its final report — which was set to reveal how Hemedti was rapidly expanding his corporate empire — Burhan and Hemedti expelled the civilians and seized power.

But the masters of the coup have fallen. Al-Burhan called for the Rapid Support Forces to be subject to army command.

Hemedti resisted. Days before the deadline for resolving this problem in April 2023, RSF units moved to besiege the army headquarters and seize the main bases and the National Palace in Khartoum.

The coup failed. Instead, Khartoum became a war zone as rival forces fought street to street.

Violence exploded in Darfur, where Rapid Support Forces units launched a fierce campaign against the Masalit people.

The United Nations estimates that up to 15,000 civilians were killed, and the United States described what happened as genocide. The Rapid Support Forces denied this allegation.

Rapid Support Forces commanders distributed videos of their fighters carrying out torture and killing, declaring the atrocities and their sense of impunity.

The Rapid Support Forces and allied militias swept across Sudan, looting cities, markets, universities, and hospitals.

A torrent of looted goods is offered for sale in what is popularly known as the “Dagolo Markets” and extends beyond Sudan to Chad and other neighboring countries. The Rapid Support Forces denied the involvement of its fighters in the looting.

Hemedti, trapped in the National Palace under artillery shelling and air strikes, was severely injured in the first weeks of the conflict and disappeared from sight.

When he reappeared months later, he showed no remorse for the atrocities committed, and was no less determined to win the war on the battlefield.

The RSF obtained modern weapons, including advanced drones, which they used to strike Burhan’s de facto capital, Port Sudan, which played a crucial role in the attack on El Fasher.

Investigative reporting by The New York Times, among others, has documented that these planes are being transported through an airstrip and supply base built by the United Arab Emirates inside Chad. The UAE denies arming the Rapid Support Forces.

Thanks to these weapons, the Rapid Support Forces entered into a strategic impasse with their former partner, the Sudanese army.

Hemedti is trying to build a political coalition that includes some civilian groups and armed movements, most notably his former opponents in the Nuba Mountains.

He formed a parallel “government of peace and unity” and assumed the presidency for himself.

With the capture of El Fasher, the RSF now controls almost all populated territory west of the Nile River.

Following mounting reports of mass killings and widespread condemnation, Hemedti announced the opening of an investigation into what he described as violations committed by his soldiers During the capture of the city.

The Sudanese speculate that Hemedti either sees himself as the head of a secessionist state, or still has ambitions to rule all of Sudan.

It is also possible that he sees a future as a powerful political puppet master, head of a conglomerate that controls companies, an army of mercenaries and a political party. By these means, even if he is not accepted as the popular face of Sudan, he can still pull the strings.

As Hemedti’s forces slaughter civilians in El Fasher, he is confident that he is immune in a world that couldn’t care less.

Alex de Waal is Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the United States.