Why the rebel soldiers failed where others in the region succeeded

If the coup attempt that took place last week in Benin had succeeded, this would have been the ninth coup attempt that the region has witnessed during the past five years alone.

Just days after soldiers seized power in Guinea-Bissau, while vote-counting in the presidential election was still underway, leaders of West Africa’s ECOWAS group quickly concluded that the attempt to oust Benin’s President Patrice Talon on Sunday was a destabilizing step too far.

In support of his government, Nigerian warplanes bombed rebel soldiers at the national television and radio station and a military base near Cotonou Airport, the largest city.

ECOWAS also announced the deployment of ground forces from Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone to strengthen the defense of the constitutional order.

This is a region rocked by repeated coups since 2020, which just over 10 months ago saw coup regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger withdraw their countries entirely from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – all of which were founding participants 50 years ago.

So, facing the prospect of another civilian government being overthrown by disaffected soldiers, the presidents of the remaining ECOWAS countries quickly came to the conclusion that the coup attempt in Cotonou could not be allowed to succeed.

After repelling early morning coup attacks on Talon’s home and presidential offices, loyalist forces reasserted government control over all parts of the city, closing off the main central administrative district.

But it has been difficult to crush the last-ditch resistance of the rebel forces, which have demonstrated their willingness to use lethal force without any regard for civilians.

In response, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, Benin’s eastern neighbor and the largest military force in the region, ordered air strikes, while ECOWAS leaders decided to send ground troops on the same day.

Among those sending troops is Ghana’s President John Mahama, who leads a resilient democracy but has made friendly diplomatic overtures to military regimes in the Sahel region.

By acting so quickly, ECOWAS may have learned a lesson from its ill-conceived response to the 2023 coup in Niger.

On that occasion, there was practically no organized military intervention in the hours after the coup leaders arrested the elected head of state, Mohamed Bazoum – the only moment, perhaps, when a quick commando raid to rescue him and secure key buildings would have had any chance of success.

By the time the bloc threatened intervention and began planning for it, the opportunity had been lost: the new junta had consolidated its control over the Nigerian army and mobilized popular opinion to support it.

Faced with the prospect of the intervention turning into a full-scale war, and under strong domestic popular pressure to avoid any such bloodbath, ECOWAS leaders backed down and chose to rely on sanctions. When those steps proved counterproductive, they settled on the diplomatic path alone.

This time, in Benin, the situation was very different: Talon was still in complete control, even if some would-be coup plotters were still resisting. Therefore, as the internationally recognized president, he can legitimately request support from member states of the regional bloc.

This appears to have had popular support in Cotonou.

Many Beninese citizens have grievances against the current government, especially regarding the exclusion of the Democratic Party, the main opposition party, from the upcoming presidential elections.

But there is a strong culture in Benin of trying to achieve change through political action and civil society work, rather than force.

The Bennois are rightly proud of the role their country played as a leading instigator of the wave of peaceful mass protests and democratization that swept French-speaking Africa in the early 1990s.

While complaints against Talon aired by would-be coup plotters during their brief appearances on national television were widespread, there was no sign at all of any popular support for their attempt to get rid of the government by force.

Benin thus represented a particularly appropriate context for ECOWAS’s strong intervention in defense of constitutional civilian rule.

In fact, the coup plotters are likely to become the target of increasing public anger as news of casualties spreads. At least one civilian, the wife of Talon’s chief military advisor, was killed.

In recent days two senior military officials Those kidnapped during Sunday’s failed coup attempt in Benin have been rescued, but security forces are still searching for coup leader Lt. Colonel Pascal Tigre and other conspirators.

This was just the latest in a series of coup attempts across the region, although most of the others were in fact successful.

They have all occurred in a context of fragility and stress across West Africa at a time of Islamist violence in the Sahel, which is now spreading to the northern regions of many coastal countries.

There is dissatisfaction with traditional political elites. Even when economies are growing well, there is a severe shortage of jobs and viable livelihoods for the region’s rapidly growing youth population.

However, although the regional context is widely shared, the drivers of coups are often local – country-specific.

The lack of popular support for the Cotonou putschists stands in stark contrast to the mood on the streets of Conakry, the Guinean capital, in September 2021, when Special Forces commander Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya led the overthrow of then-President Alpha Condé.

Like Talon, Condé was first elected democratically, but later won re-election under questionable circumstances, and oversaw a significant erosion of political freedoms. After in GuineaCondé oversaw violent abuses on a much larger scale than in Benin.

In addition, Condé had forcefully fought his way into a third term at the age of 83. While 67-year-old Tallon promised to step down next April, even if he modified the electoral rules to almost guarantee an easy victory for his chosen successor, Finance Minister Romuald Wadani.

Another key difference is Condé’s very disappointing economic record, while Talon has overseen strong growth and improved services.

To the north, the wave of coups seen in Sahel countries in recent years has also been driven by local circumstances.

in financial and Burkina FasoHowever, military leaders have become frustrated with the weak leadership provided by elected presidents in the campaign against the Islamists. In both countries, forces repeatedly suffered heavy losses while stationed Civilian governments seemed unable to mobilize additional weapons or even food at times needed by the forces.

There was also deep dissatisfaction with France’s inability to subdue the jihadists, despite the high-tech weapons at the disposal of its forces spread throughout the Sahel.

Also in Mali, some nationalist sections of political and military opinion have been frustrated by the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement with former Tuareg separatists in the far north, which was overseen by UN forces. The militants even accused French forces of preventing Bamako from deploying national army units to the north.

in NigerThe circumstances surrounding the 2023 coup were equally distinctive.

Political support for Bazoum has been eroded by his publicly close partnership with France, especially his request from Paris to provide forces to defend the northwestern border from raids by jihadists based in Mali.

However, his outspoken support for judges investigating a defense procurement corruption scandal may also threaten to alienate powerful elements in the military.

The coup that followed shortly thereafter in Gabonin August 2023, was similarly the product of local frustrations. In this case, the ambiguous management of election results that saw an implausible victory awarded to President Ali Bongo, who was in frail health after a slow recovery from a stroke.

Therefore, circumstances vary greatly. Recent events confirm this trend.

It is certain that the region is facing a real security crisis, and in many countries, a political or development crisis as well.

But national circumstances are often the main driver of any unrest or coup attempt.

Many doubt the army’s seizure of power Guinea Bissau With the aim of preventing the opposition’s possible victory in the elections.

While the Benin rebels appear to have been motivated by a mixture of military grievances and broader political and economic grievances.

But they grossly misjudged the popular appetite in Cotonou for any violent or radical change in the regime.